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The optimal reporting frequency is an important issue in accounting. In many production
settings, substitution e⁄ects across periods occur. This paper shows that the optimal re-
porting frequency depends on the strength of the substitution e⁄ect and on the information
content of performance signals. For a subset of parameter combinations - the low-chance
scenario - infrequent reporting is always e¢ cient; for other parameter combinations - the
high-chance scenario - infrequent reporting is e¢ cient as long as ￿rst-period signals show
high informativeness (and substitution e⁄ects are strong). Limited commitment by the prin-
cipal does not in￿ uence results.
Keywords: dynamic agency; intertemporal aggregation; reporting frequency, performance
measurement; substitutable tasks; commitment
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1 Introduction
The optimal reporting frequency or frequency of performance evaluation is an important is-
sue in accounting. Stated di⁄erently, one could ask whether short-term or long-term performance
measures should be relevant for variable compensation. Especially in light of the recent ￿nancial
crisis where short-termism was often considered to be one of its causes, the question appears
highly relevant. Corporate governance codes also address the question.1 While short-termism
may not be unambiguously detrimental to a ￿rm￿ s development (Dobbs 2009; Repenning and
Henderson 2010), the potential problem with short-term evaluations arises if outcomes in di⁄er-
ent accounting periods are not independent from each other: Meeting a performance target in
one period (quarter or half-year etc.) may make it harder to meet the target in the next period
because demand is limited or there exists only a certain success potential for the whole time
under consideration. For example, consider a sales manager who faces a certain annual demand
￿Dr. Christian Lukas, Junior Professor in Business Administration and Accounting, University of Konstanz,
Dept. of Economics, Box D-144, 78457 Konstanz, Germany; Phone: 0049/7531/882829, Fax: 0049/7531/884456;
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1The German corporate governance code stipulates long-term performance measures for purposes of variable
compensation of the board. See http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/index-e.htmlin the industry. Now closing a deal in the ￿rst quarter which helps to meet the quarterly perfor-
mance target may reduce the chances to meet the target in the next quarter because a fraction
of demand has already realized. Or, think of cost-reduction e⁄ort. If the manager succeeds in
cutting costs in say the ￿rst half of the year it becomes more di¢ cult to further reduce costs
in the second half of the year (for given production levels of course). Technically, the tasks
in di⁄erent periods represent substitutes ￿increasing the chances to succeed in a given period
comes at the cost of decreasing those for a subsequent period. It is the objective of this paper to
analyze the optimal frequency of performance evaluation if substitution e⁄ects between periods
exist.
Intertemporal aggregation of performance measures, frequency of feedback or the bene￿ts
(and costs) of withholding performance information constitutes a growing literature.2 Rewarding
aggregate performance is optimal if no interaction e⁄ects between periods exist regardless of
whether the agent observes interim outcomes (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987) or not (Arya et
al. 2004). Here aggregation does not entail a loss of information. As soon as interaction e⁄ects
are present the loss of information cannot be avoided but intertemporal aggregation may still
have its merits.3 Possible bene￿ts include avoidance of information overload given bounded
rationality, a better sorting of employees (Ray 2007a), retaining employees (Ray 2007b) or
preventing sabotage in tournaments (G￿rtler et al. 2010). The frequency of evaluation also
in￿ uences attitudes of those who are evaluated (Cook 1967) and the steepness of the incentive
scheme (Arnaiz and FumÆs 2008). What unites theoretical arguments in favor of less frequent or
aggregate evaluations is restraining the agent￿ s opportunism. If less information is available to
the agent when selecting e⁄ort at di⁄erent points in time, simply less opportunities for exploiting
information exist.4 That seems to be of special importance if production and performance
measurement interact. Guymon et al. (2008) and Demski et al. (2008) study multi-agent, single-
period settings with such interactions, while Dikolli et al. (2009) address substitutability and
complementarity in tasks of a single agent in a one-period agency. The latter ￿nd that changes
in performance measure interrelations and eventually pro￿ts depend on the type of interaction
between tasks.5 Given that interactions matter in single-period problems they should likewise
matter in multi-period problems.
In this paper I analyze how substitutability between tasks across periods a⁄ects the optimal
frequency of performance evaluation. For that purpose I consider a two-period agency model
with risk-neutral contracting parties but the agent is protected by limited liability. Higher e⁄ort
2The literature on intra-period aggregation is growing, too. See, for example, Arya et al. (1997); Arya and
Mittendorf (2008); Cremer (1995); Christensen et al. (2002); Datar and Gupta (1994); Feltham et al. (2006); or
Indjejikian and Nanda (1999).
3There are cases where aggregation actually leads to better information because it o⁄sets possible errors in
individual accounts (Datar and Gupta 1994); or because it prevents information cascades (Arya et al. 2006).
Sunder (1997) points out that the aggregation process itself may add information.
4In some contrast to that the management literature advocates prompt and timely feedback to motivate
employees (Milkovich and Newman 2002; Wright and Snell 1998).
5See Iyer et al. (2005) or Siggelkow (2002) for an analysis of such task interaction in a product speci￿cation
setting or with regard to organizational consequences.
2increases the chance to succeed in each period but e⁄ort in period 1 a⁄ects period 2 in the
following way: The higher the e⁄ort in period 1 the lower the probability to succeed in period
2. This is the characterizing feature of substitutable tasks. In light of possibly very short
evaluation periods due to computerized accounting systems, the assumption of substitutability
appears relevant in many cases. Meeting a potentially ambitious performance target may come
at the cost of lower chances to meet it in a subsequent period. The principal can choose between
two evaluation systems. Under frequent evaluation, the accounting system reports performance
at the end of each single period; under infrequent evaluation, a single report at the end of the
second period covering both periods is prepared. I initially assume that neither the principal
nor the agent observes the outcome of period 1 under infrequent evaluation. As it turns out,
the principal cannot bene￿t from renegotiations after period 1 and therefore the setting in this
paper is e⁄ectively one where the principal has the option to withhold performance information
from the agent. According to the management and compensation literature in many cases ￿rms
carry out evaluations but do not inform employees (truthfully).6 A possible scenario would be
a two-tier hierarchy with sales personnel, regional heads and headquarters where headquarters
is better informed about cost allocations than regional heads. While Ray (2007b) shows that
the ￿rms￿ desire to retain workers helps explain this practice, I argue that lower incentive
costs can provide another rationale for it. With substitution e⁄ects between periods, a lower
reporting frequency or infrequent evaluation is either unconditionally e¢ cient (in the low-chance
scenario) or conditionally e¢ cient if substitution e⁄ects are su¢ ciently strong (in the high-chance
scenario).
My paper is most closely related to research on intertemporal aggregation in dynamic
agency relationships by Nikias et al. (2005) and Lukas (2010) who employ a probability structure
similar to the one in this paper. Both consider complementary tasks across periods and ￿nd that
infrequent evaluation can be e¢ cient. A notable di⁄erence is that the principal weakly prefers
infrequent evaluation in Nikias et al. (2005), while it takes a su¢ ciently low informativeness of
the ￿rst-period outcome to make it e¢ cient in Lukas (2010). Di⁄erent long-term e⁄ects of ￿rst-
period e⁄ort explain the di⁄erence. While only high e⁄ort entails a long-term e⁄ect in Nikias
et al. (2005), both high e⁄ort and low e⁄ort in period 1 a⁄ect period 2 outcome probabilities in
Lukas (2010). Nikias et al. (2005) also consider substitutable tasks (or negative complements in
their terminology). Only a weak substitution e⁄ect leads to infrequent evaluation being optimal.
In my model, in contrast, a strong substitution e⁄ect represents a su¢ cient condition for the
e¢ ciency of infrequent evaluation. Again the di⁄erence in the long-term e⁄ects of ￿rst-period
e⁄ort accounts for the contrary ￿ndings. In sum, the work of Nikias et al. (2005), Lukas (2010)
and this paper demonstrate that infrequent evaluation can be optimal even if interaction e⁄ects
between periods exist. The conditions under which that optimality holds are, however, sensible
to these speci￿c interaction e⁄ects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I introduce the model
and Section 3 presents the benchmark analysis of independent periods. Section 4 represents the
6See Ray (2007b) and the references therein.
3main part of the paper investigating substitutable tasks and their implication for the optimal
reporting frequency. As an extension, Section 5 considers the setting with (partly) observable
interim outcomes. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 The model
I analyze a dynamic principal-agent relationship that lasts for two periods. The principal
hires the agent to perform a certain task in each period: Both can commit to stay in the agency
that long. By assumption, e⁄ort is binary in each period, et 2 f0;1g, at costs C(et) = cet,
c > 0. Due to the unobservability of the agent￿ s e⁄ort the principal relies on output-contingent
compensation to motivate the agent. The veri￿able outcome in each period can be either high,
xH, or low, xL. E⁄ort in￿ uences the probability distribution of outcomes in the following way:
P(x1 = xH) = pe1 (1)






In any given period, higher e⁄ort increases the probability of the high outcome, i.e.,
0 < !e1=0 < !e1=1 < 1;! = p;q. However, the higher the e⁄ort in period 1 the lower the
probability of the high outcome in period 2. That means a substitution e⁄ect exists. Its ex-
tent is jointly determined by the probability of the high outcome in period 1, pe1, and by the
dependency parameter ￿;0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Clearly, ￿ = 0 leads to no dependency, i.e., periods are
independent. Maximum dependence then obtains if ￿ = 1: The analysis of the former case
delivers the benchmark result.
The agent receives output-contingent compensation. Provided that the output sequence
(x1 = xi;x2 = xj), i;j 2 fL;Hg, is achieved, she is eligible for payment sij. The corresponding




e1;e2 contingent on the agent￿ s e⁄ort in both


























































































































Table 1: Probabilities of output sequences ￿
ij
e1;e2 contingent on agent e⁄ort
Both parties are assumed to be risk-neutral. Contractual frictions result from the agent￿ s
limited liability. It requires that all payments to the agent have to be nonnegative, sij ￿
0;i;j = L;H: Furthermore, the agent￿ s utility from compensation and e⁄ort is separable7 with
7For a characterization and justi￿cation of the form u(s1;s2) = u(s1 + s2); where st;t = 1;2; is the payment
in period t; see Fishburn (1965).
4U(sij;e1;e2) = sij￿c(e1+e2): To concentrate on the accounting e⁄ects of aggregation, I assume
zero discounting and no time preference so that timing of payments leaves utility una⁄ected.
To establish an incentive problem, the agent￿ s e⁄ort generates enough value and the principal
wants to induce high e⁄ort in every period.8
The principal may decide between two di⁄erent evaluation regimes9: the frequent evaluation
regime (disaggregate performance evaluation) where performance is measured in every period;
or the infrequent evaluation regime (aggregate performance evaluation) where performance is
measured once at the end of period 2.










e1;e2 ￿ si+j ￿ c ￿ (e1 + e2) given aggregate evaluation. Notice, (i + j) refers
to aggregate output resulting from period 1 outcome xi; and period 2 outcome xj;i;j = L;H:
Infrequent evaluation does not allow the principal to di⁄erentiate between outcome sequences
(xL;xH) and (xH;xL) for compensation purposes. At the same time, however, the agent chooses
her second-period action without knowing ￿rst-period outcome, i.e., e2 is not conditioned on x1
as in the frequent evaluation regime. The principal￿ s program under either regime obtains as
follows.









E(S1;1) ￿ 0 (4)
E(S1;1) ￿ E(S0;0) (5)















































sij ￿ 0; i;j 2 fL;Hg: (9)
The principal needs to ensure the agent￿ s participation given a reservation utility of u = 0,
constraint (4). Conditions (5)-(8) denote incentive compatibility constraints to make the agent
prefer high e⁄ort to low e⁄ort in period 1, constraints (5) and (6); and high e⁄ort to low
e⁄ort in period 2 contingent on the observation of a high ￿rst-period outcome, constraint (7),
or a low ￿rst-period outcome, constraint (8), respectively. (9) denotes the liability constraint,
i.e., payments to the agent must be non-negative. The program without constraint (9) will be
referred to as the unconstrained program.
8See Sch￿ndube (2008) for an analysis where the principal trades-o⁄ high period 1 e⁄ort against high period
2 e⁄ort.
9The labels are adapted from Arya et al. (2004).









E(S[1;1]) ￿ 0 (11)
E(S[1;1]) ￿ E(S[0;0]) (12)
E(S[1;1]) ￿ E(S[1;0]) (13)
E(S[1;1]) ￿ E(S[0;1]) (14)
si+j ￿ 0: (15)
As no outcome is observed at the end of period 1, constraints imposed on the principal￿ s
compensation contract comprise the agent￿ s participation constraint, (11), and the incentive
constraints so that high e⁄ort is preferred to all other e⁄ort combinations, constraints (12)-(14).
The liability constraint (15) restricts the set of payments si+j to non-negative payments. Again,
the program without constraint (15) will be referred to as the unconstrained program.
The analysis starts with the benchmark case of independent periods. Afterwards, the issue
of evaluation frequency under substitution e⁄ects is addressed.
3 Benchmark: Independent periods
First suppose ￿ = 0; i.e., there are no substitution e⁄ects and periods are independent.
State contingent probabilities from Table 1 simplify accordingly. The following assumptions will
prove useful for the analysis:
Identical outcome distributions (A1): pi = qi;i = 0;1.
Di⁄ering outcome distributions (A2): p1 ￿ p0 > q1 ￿ q0.
Di⁄ering outcome distributions (A3): p1 ￿ p0 < q1 ￿ q0.
If pi = qi;i = 0;1, period 1 and period 2 show identical outcome distributions; if not, single
period problems di⁄er.
Given the liability constraints (9) and (15), the solution to the principal￿ s programs (3) sub-
ject to (4)-(9), or (10) subject to (11)-(15) provides the agent with a rent. Let SLL denote the set
of payments sLL






which solves the unconstrained program (3) subject to (4)-(8). (Note that the principal￿ s pro-
gram has more than one solution if the liability constraint is not imposed.) Then the agent￿ s







n 2 SLLg (16)
6given frequent performance evaluation. Accordingly, let S2L denote the set of payments s2L
n




n g which solves the





￿ ￿ j s2L
n 2 S2Lg (17)
The di⁄erence ￿ between the rents
￿ = RFPE ￿ RIPE (18)
constitutes the decision criterion and the principal optimally chooses frequent evaluation if
￿ < 0, and infrequent evalution if ￿ > 0.
Given domain additivity and risk neutrality, the unconstrained program under FPE decom-
poses and the optimal two-period contract shows no memory (Amershi et al. 1985; Fellingham











Under IPE, it can be shown that the principal o⁄ers a contract showing s2H > sH+L = s2L = 0;
i.e., all incentives are placed on the most desirable outcome sequence. With the help of some






















Then the following relations can be readily veri￿ed:
￿A1 = RFPE ￿ RIPE(A1) = c
￿
q1q0(p1 ￿ p0)2 + p1p0(q1 ￿ q0)2￿
(p1 ￿ p0)(q1 ￿ q0)(p1q1 ￿ p0q0)
> 0;








leading to proposition 1.
Proposition 1 With independent periods, infrequent performance evaluation is e¢ cient.
10It can be veri￿ed that if A1 holds, constraint (12) binds, and if A2 or A3 holds, constraint (13) or (14) binds,
respectively.
7We know from Arya et al. (2004) and Nikias et al. (2005) that under assumption A1
the principal is better-o⁄ with infrequent evaluation.11 By example, the result does not hold
generally when A2 or A3 applies and the agent is risk averse as in Arya et al. (2004). Proposition
1 proves when contracting frictions result from limited liability, the principal prefers infrequent
evaluation even if the single-period problems di⁄er. The intuition for the result is, however,
similar to the case with identical periods. Given independent periods the outcome sequence
fxH;xHg is at least as informative as any other possible sequence. Although the principal
cannot distinguish outcome sequences fxH;xLg and fxL;xHg, which is valuable given di⁄ering
single-period problems, the principals gains enough from placing all incentives on the most
desirable (and informative) sequence. The relaxation of the incentive constraint for the lowest
e⁄ort combination [0;0] under IPE more than o⁄sets the e⁄ect of the additional constraint
sHL = sLH imposed by moving from FPE to IPE.
4 Substitutable tasks
In this section, ￿rst-period e⁄ort entails a long-term e⁄ect that stretches into period 2. To
have the substution e⁄ect as strong a possible I assume ￿ = 1: Probabilities in table 1 obtain
accordingly.
4.1 Frequent performance evaluation
The substitutability of tasks gives rise to non-stationarity in the production technology.
One may wonder whether the principal reacts to it by shifting incentives from one period into
the other. Solving the principal￿ s program (3) leads to the following optimal payments (see
Appendix A.1 for derivation):










(1 ￿ p1)(q1 ￿ q0)
; (21)
sHH = sHL +
c
(1 ￿ p1)(q1 ￿ q0)
: (22)











Inspection of (19)-(22) leads to the conclusion that the principal does not shift incen-
tives from period 1 into period 2 ￿note that (sHH ￿ sHL) = (sLH ￿ sLL) = c
(1￿p1)(q1￿q0) and
second-period incentive constraints (7) and (8) bind in the optimum. In other words, second-
period incentives are set at the sequentially rational level (Baron and Besanko 1987) or at the
11See Arya et al. (2004, p. 649f) and Nikias et al. (2005, p. 59f).
8renegotiation-proof level. It follows that the principal￿ s possible inability to fully commit to a
two-period contract does not harm e¢ ciency. In the present scenario with substitutable tasks
raising bonuses in period 2 beyond the minimum required for incentive compatibility aggra-
vates the incentive problem in period 1. Therefore, the long-term full-commitment contract is
renegotiation-proof.12 Knowing that commitment issues do not play a role under infrequent
evaluation, the result in Proposition 2 follows immediately.
Proposition 2 For any given parameters of the agency, the e¢ cient evaluation regime is the
same under full commitment and limited commitment.
The above result is noteworthy as problems in strategic interactions deriving from the
principal￿ s limited contractual commitment have been analyzed in various settings (for example,
Arya et al. 1997; Christensen et al. 2002; Demski and Frimor 1999). A possible solution to
these problems can be information rationing (Indjejikian and Nanda 1999; Lukas 2010), i.e.,
aggregation substitutes (a lack of) commitment. In this paper the principal￿ s choice of the
e¢ cient evaluation regime does not depend on his commitment.
4.2 Infrequent performance evaluation
In this section I characterize the optimal payments under infrequent evaluation and de-
termine the agent￿ s rent under that regime. Infrequent evaluation comes at the cost of losing
information: Instead of the sequence of performances the principal only gets to know the aggre-
gate performance. This of course renders di⁄erentiating payments for output sequences fxL;xHg
and fxH;xLg impossible. On the bene￿t side, less information will be available to the agent as
well, curbing her opportunism when selecting e⁄ort in period 2.
Depending on the binding incentive constraint(s), optimal payments can be derived for
program (10). They are summarized in Table 2.


















Table 2: Optimal payments under infrequent evaluation
12Introduction of risk-aversion on the agent￿ s side leaves this result una⁄ected.
9Keep in mind that the cases in Table 2 may occur subsequently in various orders. Fix
second-period parameters q0 and q1 and ￿rst-period parameter p0; then with p1 increasing, for
example, case (1) may follow case (3) or vice versa and eventually case (4) becomes relevant.




































1(1 + p0p1) ￿ q1p0p1
￿
(p1 ￿ p0)








With rents under either evaluation regime being speci￿ed the comparison identi￿es the
e¢ cient regime. This will be done in the next section.
4.3 Optimal frequency of performance evaluation
Under either evaluation regime the agent receives a rent due to her limited liability. The
principal￿ s decision in favor of one of the regimes optimally trades-o⁄more contractible informa-
tion under FPE against less agent opportunism when selecting second-period e⁄ort under IPE.
One may suspect that ￿in the absence of commitment problems ￿availability of more infor-
mative signals leads to optimality of frequent evaluation. As the analysis shows, the opposite is
true: The more informative the signal becomes in period 1, the more likely is the optimality of
infrequent evaluation.
I de￿ne two scenarios which characterize quite di⁄erent situations for performance eval-
uation. Scenario 1 comprises all circumstances where either incentive constraint (12) or in-


















(13) to be singly binding, respectively.13 Since all values p0 ￿ 0:5 are excluded from this sce-
nario, it is labeled low-chance scenario (LC): Low e⁄ort in period 1 leads to less than a fair
13For incentive constraint (12) to be singly binding, a threshold p1 for the transition to constraint (14) to be


















1q1 ￿ p1q1 ￿ 2q1p
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1 ￿ p1)q1 + (p0 ￿ p2
0)q0
￿ c = 0: (28)
The solution to (28) is p1 = 0:5 ￿
r






and p1 2 R









A similar calculation leads to the condition for constraint (13) to be singly binding.
10chance of achieving the high outcome in that period. At the same time, low e⁄ort in period 1
entails only a moderate substitution e⁄ect so that ceteris paribus chances to succeed in period
2 are higher. In contrast, the high-chance scenario (HC) consists of all cases with p0 ￿ 0:5, i.e.,
incentive constraint (12) or incentive constraint (13) never binds singly under IPE.14 Thus, the
HC scenario includes all p0-values that o⁄er at least a fair chance to succeed in period 1 given
low e⁄ort. That higher chance comes at the cost of a strong substitution e⁄ect (even) for low
e⁄ort; the probability to achieve the high outcome in period 2 decreases accordingly.
For future reference, the two scenarios are stated in separate de￿nitions.
De￿nition 1 The low-chance scenario is de￿ned as the set of parameters
LC =
￿






q1 + (q1 ￿ q0)
￿









low e⁄ort in period 1 implies less than a fair chance to achieve the high outcome in that period.
De￿nition 2 The high-chance scenario is de￿ned as the set of parameters
HC = fp0;p1;q0;q1 j p0 ￿ 0:5g;
low e⁄ort in period 1 implies at least a fair chance to achieve the high outcome in that period.
To provide more intuition for the two situations, one can also think of the LC scenario
as one where the agent faces a di¢ cult task such that it takes higher e⁄ort to possibly obtain
a fair chance to deliver high performance in period 1. In this vein, the HC scenario could be
identi￿ed as the easy-task scenario because low e⁄ort can already give a fair chance to succeed.
Depending on the scenario, the principal decides di⁄erently on the optimal evaluation regime.
Proposition 3 In the low-chance (LC) scenario, infrequent evaluation is e¢ cient, unless the
￿rst-period outcome becomes non-informative, i.e., unless p1 ! p0:
Proposition 4 In the high-chance (HC) scenario, infrequent evaluation is e¢ cient if
p1 ￿
q1(1 ￿ p0) + p0 ￿ q0
1 ￿ q0
holds; otherwise frequent evaluation is e¢ cient.
Corollary 1 A su¢ cient condition for infrequent evaluation to be e¢ cient is p1 ￿
q1(1￿p0)+p0￿q0
1￿q0 .
14To be precise, that incentive constraint (12) or incentive constraint (13) never binds singly under IPE merely
















, respectively. Assuming p0 ￿ 0:5 in the
high-chance scenario leaves out some cases where p0 < 0:5 and (12) or constraint (13) do not singly bind, but
inclusion of these cases leads to considerably more expositional strain without adding much in qualitative results.
The discussion of results, however, includes a reference to these cases.
11According to Proposition 3, the principal strictly prefers infrequent evaluation in the LC
scenario. The result holds for all possible levels of informativeness of the ￿rst-period outcome,
i.e., for all cases ranging from low informativeness, p1 ! p0, to high informativeness p1 ! 1.
To gain intuition, note that low informativeness implies a weak substitution e⁄ect. Then the
single-period problems partly separate (although not completely, of course) which resembles
the benchmark. Therefore, e¢ ciency of infrequent evaluation follows. (Recall that infrequent
evaluation is e¢ cient given independent periods.) With ￿rst-period outcome informativeness
increasing, one might expect that eventually the principal would want to observe that outcome.
However, with such increase the substitution e⁄ect becomes ever stronger, which in turn aggra-
vates the incentive problem in period 2. Therefore, the principal is again better-o⁄ with not
letting the agent know the ￿rst-period outcome.
Now consider the HC scenario. Here the substitution e⁄ect is stronger than in the LC
scenario for any level of ￿rst-period informativeness. Clearly, if the ￿rst-period outcome is quite
informative, infrequent evaluation minimizes the agent￿ s rent just as in the LC scenario. How-
ever, at low levels of informativeness the principal opts for frequent evaluation. The key to un-
derstanding why it can be e¢ cient lies in the combination of low informativeness and a relatively
strong substitution e⁄ect. From the agent￿ s point of view the e⁄ort strategy fe1 = 0;e2 = 1g
becomes quite attractive as it entails only a slightly lower probability of success in period 1 while
increasing the one in period 2. From the principal￿ s point of view the combination therefore
makes for a quite informative observation of the second-period outcome ￿which is informative
about ￿rst-period e⁄ort; and this informativeness decreases with an increasing informativeness
of ￿rst-period outcome. Hence, the observation of the second-period outcome can be bene￿cial
only at low levels of ￿rst-period outcome informativeness. To curtail the agent￿ s opportunism
and bene￿t from the informative second-period outcome the sequence of outcomes needs to be
observed and FPE is e¢ cient.15
Example 1 presents a numerical and graphical visualization of the results.
Example 1 Parameters are chosen as follows: q0 = 0:2; q1 = 0:6; c = 2. In the LC scenario,
p0 = 0:05; in the HC scenario 1, p0 = 0:5. Figure 1 plots the rents under either evaluation regime
for a varying parameter p1 given the LC scenario, and ￿gure 2 does so for the HC scenario. The
threshold in the high-chance scenario is calculated according to the condition in Proposition 4:
p1 = 0:75.

















such that (12) or (13) do not singly bind (as assumed in






q1 ￿ p0(q1 ￿ q0)





q1 ￿ p0(q1 ￿ q0)
holds for real-valued p1, and if p1 ￿
q1(1￿p0)+p0￿q0
1￿q0 (Proposition 4). Here the intuition is as follows. With p1
increasing both informativeness of ￿rst-period outcome and the substitution e⁄ect increase. At moderately high
levels then, the gain in informativeness o⁄sets the stronger substition e⁄ect and frequent evaluation becomes
e¢ cient.
12Insert Figure 1 about here.
In the LC scenario, infrequent evaluation is always e¢ cient. Think of the agent being
responsible for cost reductions. If low e⁄ort, or work-to-rule, is considered to have only a small
chance of achieving the reductions in period 1, one could think that frequent evaluation should
take place to check on the progress as early as possible. Yet choosing a longer evaluation horizon
￿i.e., infrequent evaluation ￿curtails the agent￿ s rent. The possibility of giving the agent another
chance to reduce costs before she is called to account for the reductions is valuable.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
In the HC scenario, frequent evaluation is e¢ cient as long as p1 ￿ 0:75. Again think of
the agent as being in charge for cost reductions. Now low e⁄ort in period 1 already o⁄ers an
appreciable chance to succeed and high e⁄ort cannot increase that chance very much. One could
be tempted to think that infrequent evaluation is e¢ cient as cost reductions are quite likely under
either e⁄ort and hence there is no need for an early inspection of results. However, that need
exists and a shorter evaluation horizon limits the agent￿ s rent by restraining her opportunism
￿infrequent evaluation would make the action choice fe1 = 0;e2 = 1g too attractive. With
increasing informativeness of ￿rst-period outcome the substitution e⁄ect becomes stronger and
(additional) cost reductions in period 2 become less likely. The principal reacts and evaluates
performance infrequently.
Note that, irrespective of the scenario, higher informativeness of ￿rst-period outcome leads
to optimality of infrequent evaluation (corrolary 1). Stated di⁄erently, observation of highly
informative performance measures is detrimental to ￿rm pro￿t when tasks bring about substi-
tution e⁄ects across reporting periods. This results contrasts the ￿nding in Lukas (2010) for
complementary tasks where low informativeness of signals leads to optimality of infrequent eval-
uation. In addition the result should be compared with the one from Nikias et al. (2005). They
￿nd that a weak substitution e⁄ect leads to the optimality of infrequent evaluation whereas I
demonstrate that it may be optimal under strong substitution e⁄ects as well. The puzzle van-
ishes if the di⁄ering e⁄ect of low e⁄ort in period 1 is taken into consideration. In Nikias et al.
(2005) low ￿rst-period e⁄ort does not directly a⁄ect the success probability in period 2 but in
my model it does. As a consequence, the outcome in period 2 becomes a less reliable indicator
of period 1 e⁄ort and hence its observation is less bene￿cial. This is evident in the likelihood
ratio for a high outcome in period 2 given high e⁄ort in both periods versus low e⁄ort in both
periods: If the informativeness of period 1 outcome increases, the likelihood increases in Nikias
et al. (2005), but it decreases in this paper.
5 Observability of interim outcome
The preceding analysis assumes non-observability of the interim outcome ￿neither prin-
cipal nor agent know about ￿rst-period results before the contractual relationship continues in
13period 2. While there may be cases where the assumption does not seem too restrictive ￿e.g.,
routines for closing the accounting cycle determine a certain frequency of reports, or performance
evaluations require data collection and processing that take place only at pre-determined points
in time ￿ , access to interim outcomes describes business reality in many other cases. One can
think of sales personnel or production managers who know about revenues or costs at virtually
any point in time. If, for example, allocation of overhead cannot be perfectly predicted, obser-
vation of interim information becomes a noisy signal of the actual interim outcome.16 Therefore
this section explores the consequences of a (partial) observability of the interim outcome on the
e¢ ciency of infrequent performance evaluation. I con￿ne the analysis to the possibility that the
agent observes the interim outcome or a noisy but informative signal of that outcome. Due to
the agent￿ s linear utility in money, the principal cannot bene￿t from outcome observation and
possible renegotiations after period 1 - see section 4.1 - so that results would not change either
if the principal does observe the outcome in period 1. It holds, ￿rst, for the frequent evaluation
regime but it also holds for the infrequent evaluation regime. To see it, note that the principal
would never communicate x1 = xL if IPE shows s2L = sH+L = 0 < s2H: And if x1 = xH
and (or) IPE shows s2L < sH+L the principal cannot bene￿t from renegotiations either since
risk-reallocation does not have value due to risk-neutrality of both parties. Hence, all situations
where the principal decides not to reveal interim information to the agent are already covered
by the preceding analysis.
5.1 Interim outcome perfectly observable
The optimal payments under IPE are given in Table 2. In cases (1) and (2) only the total
2xH leads to a non-zero payment. It immediately follows that observation of x1 = xL destroys
all e⁄ort incentives for period 2. Of course, observing x1 = xH does no harm. In case (3) the
agent receives non-zero payments for achieving the total outcome 2xH or fxH + xLg: It can be
easily veri￿ed that if (sH+L ￿s2L) < (s2H ￿sH+L) holds, observation of x1 = xL again destroys
incentives for period 2. If the pay structure shows (sH+L ￿ s2L) > (s2H ￿ sH+L); the agent
selects e⁄ort in period 2 only in response to a low outcome x1 = xL; a high outcome apparently
erases e⁄ort incentives for period 2.
As expected, infrequent performance evaluation cannot be e¢ cient (and maintain incentives
in period 2) if the agent is able to perfectly observe the interim outcome at the end of period 1.
5.2 Interim outcome partly observable
Now assume at the end of period 1 the agent receives an informative signal ￿;￿ 2 fL;Hg;
that has probability ￿; 1
2 < ￿ < 1; of indicating the correct interim outcome, i.e., Pr(￿ = L j
x1 = xL) = Pr(￿ = H j x1 = xH) = ￿: Given the e¢ ciency of frequent evaluation with perfect
observation and the possible e¢ ciency of infrequent evaluation with no observation, one may
suppose that partial observation of the interim outcome could be innocuous. As Proposition 5
16See Solomons (1965, pp. 66⁄) for examples and causes of forecast problems in this context.
14and Proposition 6 show there exists a range of signal accuracy for the low-chance scenario only
such that partial observation has no detrimental e⁄ect on incentive compatibility under IPE and
hence it remains e¢ cient.
Proposition 5 In the low-chance scenario with partly observation, infrequent evaluation re-
mains e¢ cient if the agent observes the correct interim outcome with a probability ￿ ￿ ￿ where
￿ depends on the relevant incentive constraint(s) such that:






1￿q0 (13) and (14)
Otherwise frequent evaluation is e¢ cient.
Proposition 6 In the high-chance scenario with partly observation, frequent evaluation is e¢ -
cient.
Only in the low-chance scenario, the agent may observe a noisy signal of the interim outcome
at the end of period 1 and still IPE constitutes the e¢ cient choice.17 What comes out as
a necessary condition for the result is that s2H is the only non-zero payment in the optimal
pay scheme without observation. As soon as the principal optimally o⁄ers a non-zero payment
sH+L given no observation (case (4) of Table 2), the observation of an informative signal after
period 1 renders IPE infeasible; e⁄ort incentives in period 2 simply disappear following the
observation of the signal. Intuitively, if for compensation purposes the principal does not need
to distinguish between total outcomes f2xLg and fxH + xLg, the agent may without problems
have access to information indicating which one is more likely. However, whenever the principal
does distinguish between the two outcomes, the agent￿ s access to the information must be denied
(if possible). In this case, when both sH+L and s2H are non-zero, the information whether f2xLg
or fxH + xLg is the more likely total outcome becomes critical.
Example 2 Returning to Example 1, IPE is e¢ cient in the low-chance scenario given no obser-
vation. It remains e¢ cient under partial observation as long as 1
2 < ￿ ￿
1:25[0:6(1￿p1)2+0:2095￿0:2p1]
1￿p1
holds (the threshold given the binding incentive constraint (12) applies here). And as Figure 3
exempli￿es, the probability of observing the correct interim outcome, or the signal accuracy, may
be well above 0.5. If p1 = 0:72 the threshold for signal accuracy drops to ￿ = 0:5, i.e., the agent
can only be allowed to observe a non-informative signal.
17As already noted, assuming p0 ￿ 0:5 in the high-chance scenario leaves out some cases where p0 < 0:5
and (12) or constraint (13) do not singly bind. In these cases, there may be parameter combinations such that
IPE remains e¢ cient under partial observation; they would require, however, p0 ￿ 0:5 and thus approach the
low-chance scenario.
15Insert Figure 3 about here.
6 Summary and conclusion
This paper analyzes the optimal frequency of performance evaluations if substitution e⁄ects
across periods exist. That means the performance in one period can only be increased at the
cost of lower success probabilities in the future. The assumption appears reasonable for many
situations where ever shorter evaluation periods with ambitious performance targets are chosen.
I assume risk-neutral contracting parties and limited liability of the agent. As a ￿rst result
I show that the principal always sets second-period bonuses at sequentially rational levels in
the initial contract under frequent evalution. Therefore he cannot bene￿t from renegotiations
after the ￿rst period and can credibly commit to withhold performance information so that
infrequent evaluation is feasible even if the principal observes interim outcomes. Infrequent
evaluation proves to be e¢ cient either unconditionally - in the low-chance scenario -, or if the
substitution e⁄ect is su¢ ciently strong - in the high-chance scenario. The low-chance (high-
chance) scenario refers to all parameter combinations where the agent has less than (at least
a) fair chance to succeed in period 1 given low e⁄ort. Surprisingly, the result continues to hold
in the low-chance scenario even if the agent observes a noisy signal of the interim outcome.
Implications of this research relate to performance evaluations and the choice of the length of
the evaluation period. Although computerized accounting systems would allow for rather short
evaluation periods, longer evaluation periods are proven preferable from an incentive perspective.
A short-term orientation of the ￿rm manifested in a high frequency of performance evaluations
and correspondingly short evaluation periods may not even pay in the short-term.
In the present analysis performance measures are exclusively used for control purposes.
Alternative uses of accounting information, e.g., for learning about managerial ability or for
decision making are not considered in this paper. Since more information helps to better infer
managerial ability, a counterveiling e⁄ect to the substitution e⁄ect favoring less frequent evalu-
ation would occur. However, for experienced managers with long tenure learning e⁄ects might
be negligible reinforcing the argument in favor of infrequent evaluation.
Another promising way to add insights to our knowledge about the e¢ ciency of (in)frequent
evaluation might be to include psychological aspects. For instance, we know from Cook (1967)
already that frequency of feedback is related to satisfaction with and interest in the job so
that better performance may result from more frequent feedback. Yet there could be a critical
frequency where interest and satisfaction decline leading to inferior performance. Adding addi-
tional uses of accounting information and psychological aspects to the analysis would therefore
help to derive additional insightful results.
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(1 ￿ p1)(q1 ￿ q0)
￿ ￿i; ￿i ￿ 1;i 2 fL;Hg (29)
such that second-period incentives constraints are satis￿ed. Plugging in (29) into incentive
constraint (6), E(S1;1) = E(S0;1), and then into participation constraint (4) leads to the agent￿ s
rent:
RFPE = 2c ￿ p1
c
p1 ￿ p0
+p1 f[1 ￿ (p1 + p0)q1] ￿ (1 ￿ p1)g ￿ q1
c




(1 ￿ p0)2 ￿ (1 ￿ p1)2
p1 ￿ p0




(1 ￿ p1)(q1 ￿ q0)
￿L (30)
It can be shown that (30) is minimized if ￿L = ￿H = 1 and (29) simpli￿es accordingly. Plugging
in into incentive constraint (6) ￿incentive constraint (5), E(S1;1) ￿ E(S0;0), is slack ￿and given
sLL = 0 optimal payments in (19)-(22) obtain.￿
A.2 Proof of proposition 3
Rent di⁄erences between frequent evaluation and infrequent evaluation obtain by substract-
ing rents under IPE as given in (24)-(27) from the one under FPE as given in (23):

















(1 ￿ p1)(q1 ￿ q0)
￿
(32)
￿(3) = RFPE ￿ RIPE(3) = c
(p1 ￿ p2
1)p0(q1 ￿ q0) ￿ [(p1 ￿ p0) ￿ (p2
1 ￿ p2
0)]q1
(p1 ￿ p0)(1 ￿ p1)(q1 ￿ q0)(p1 + p0 ￿ 1)
(33)
￿(4) = RFPE ￿ RIPE(4) = c
(1 ￿ p0)[(p1 ￿ p0) ￿ (q1 ￿ q0) ￿ p1q0 + p0q1]p1q1
(p1 ￿ p0)(1 ￿ p1)(q1 ￿ q0)[p1 ￿ q1(1 ￿ p0)]
; (34)
where the index i = f1;2;3;4g indicates the corresponding cases from Table 2 in section 4.2.
To ease exposition and traceability, incentive constraint E(S[1;1]) ￿ E(S[i;j]);i;j 2 f0;1g
will be referred to as (i,j) indicating the act combination fe1 = i;e2 = jg that must not lead
to higher utility for the agent than the desired act combination fe1 = 1;e2 = 1g under FPE or
IPE, respectively. Under IPE, di⁄erent incentive constraints may bind subsequently in di⁄erent
order. However, as p1 ! 1 both (1,0) and (0,1) bind.
Step 1. Assume ￿rst, incentive constraint (0,1) does not bind for all p1. If incentive
constraint (0,0) or (1,0) singly binds under IPE, IPE is e¢ cient. Inspection of ￿(2) in (32)
proves the latter. To prove the former, observe that IPE shows E(S[1;1]) = E(S[0;0]) if (0,0)
singly binds. FPE would show E(S[1;1]) = E(S[0;0]) as well if sequential rationality constraints
17(7) and (8) need not be satis￿ed. Adding these two constraints leads to E(S[1;1]) = E(S[1;0]) =
E(S[0;1]) > E(S[0;0]) under FPE making the initially binding constraint slack. Hence the solution
cannot improve and IPE is e¢ cient. Now if both (1,0) and (0,1) bind subsequent to either (0,0)
or (1,0), IPE is also e¢ cient at the level of p1 where the transition in binding constraints takes
place. This implies ￿(4) > 0 in (34). Since ￿(4) is increasing in p1, IPE continues to be e¢ cient.
Step 2. Now assume incentive constraint (0,1) binds for a set of p1-values. Further
assume with p1 increasing, (0,1) binds prior to (0,0) or (1,0). For p1 ! p0, FPE is e¢ cient
since limp1!p0 ￿(3) < 0 in (33). For p1 su¢ ciently close to p0 but not p1 ! p0; IPE is e¢ cient
since ￿(3) > 0 in (33) holds. To check whether the sign of ￿(3) can change, note that the










(1 ￿ 2p1)[p0(q1 ￿ q0) ￿ q1] Q 0 , p1 Q 0:5: Since p0 < 0:5 in the LC scenario, the nominator in
￿(3) monotonically decreases in p1 for p1 2 (p0;0:5): It can be shown that the transition from
(0,1) binding to (1,0) or (0,0) binding occurs for p1 = p1 < 0:5. At p1, ￿(3) > 0 in (33) still
holds and no change of sign of ￿(3) occurs for p1 2 (p0;p1]: For p1 2 (p1;1) step 1 of the proof
applies and IPE is e¢ cient for p1 2 (p0;1):
Step 3. Still assume incentive constraint (0,1) binds for a set of p1-values but assume fur-
ther, with p1 increasing, (0,1) binds subsequent to (0,0) or (1,0). It can be shown that the transi-










(1 ￿ 2p1)[p0(q1 ￿ q0) ￿ q1] > 0 if p1 > 0:5; the positive nominator in ￿(3) further increases. If
the transition in incentive constraints from (0,1) to both (1,0) and (0,1) occurs, ￿(4) > 0 in
(34). Since ￿(4) is increasing in p1, IPE continues to be e¢ cient. Therefore IPE is e¢ cient for
p1 2 (p0;1):
If the incentive constraint (0,1) binds subsequent to (0,0) and prior to (1,0), steps 2 and 3
apply accordingly.￿
A.3 Proof of proposition 4
In the high-chance scenario incentive constraints (0,0) and (1,0) never bind singly because
no real-valued p1 exists for the transition to the binding (0,1) constraint. (See footnote 13.)
Transition from (0,1) binding to both (0,1) and (1,0) binding occurs at b p1 =
q1(1￿p0)
q1(1￿p0)+p0: The














[q1(1 ￿ p0 ￿ p1) ￿ p0p1(1 ￿ q1)]
￿
q1(p0 ￿ p2
0) ￿ q0(p1 ￿ p2
1)
￿
(1 ￿ p1)[p1 ￿ q1(1 ￿ p0)](q1 ￿ q0)(p1 ￿ p0)(p0 + p1 ￿ 1)
￿ c = 0: (35)
For p0 ￿ 0:5, the term in the right brackets decreases monotonically. Therefore the term in
the left brackets is candidate for transition from (0,1) binding to both (0,1) and (1,0). Then
it can be shown that p0 ￿ 0:5 implies b p1 < 0:5 - contradicting the assumption p0 < p1. Hence
18both (0,1) and (1,0) bind if p0 ￿ 0:5: Since limp1!p0 ￿(4) < 0 and limp1!1 ￿(4) > 0 in (34) the
threshold p1 ￿
q1(1￿p0)+p0￿q0
1￿q0 obtains for IPE to be e¢ cient.￿
A.4 Proof of proposition 5
Consider case (1) from Table 2 and incentive constraint (0,0) is binding. The incentive
compatibility constraint for period 2 with observation of signal ￿ = L obtains as
￿ ￿ 0 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ p1)q1s2H






(1 ￿ p1)(q1 ￿ q0)(1 ￿ ￿)
(36)
must hold to maintain e⁄ort incentives under partial observation. Since s2H
(1) = 2c
p1(1￿p1)q1￿p0(1￿p0)q0
(see Table 2), condition (36) is ful￿lled if ￿ ￿
(1￿p1)2q1+(1￿p1)(q1￿q0)+q0[(p1￿p0)￿(1￿p0)2]
2(1￿p1)(q1￿q0) . Proceed-
ing in a similar way, the condition for case (3) where (0,1) is binding obtains. In both cases,
incentive constraints after observing ￿ = H are met for any ￿ > 1
2.
The conditions for case (4) where both (0,1) and (1,0) are binding are given by
p1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ p1 if (s2H
(4) ￿ sH+L
(4) ) ￿ (sH+L
(4) ￿ s2L
(4)) > 0, or (37)
1 ￿ p1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p1 if (s2H
(4) ￿ sH+L
(4) ) ￿ (sH+L
(4) ￿ s2L
(4)) < 0 (38)
holds. It can be shown that
(s2H
(4) ￿ sH+L
(4) ) ￿ (sH+L
(4) ￿ s2L
(4)) ? 0 , p1 ?
q1(1 ￿ p0) + p0 ￿ q0
1 ￿ q0
: (39)
Recall that (0,1) and (1,0) jointly bind only if p1 ￿ 1
2; hence condition (37) cannot be met. Only
(38) can be met if 1
2 < ￿ ￿
q1(1￿p0)+p0￿q0
1￿q0 .
In case (2) with (1,0) binding ￿ = 0 or ￿ = 1 must hold after observing ￿ = L or ￿ = H;
respectively, conditions which cannot hold at the same time.￿
A.5 Proof of proposition 6
For case (4) condition (37) cannot be met because the high-chance scenario shows 0:5 ￿
p0 < p1. Note also that condition (38) cannot be met either because IPE is e¢ cient if and only
if p1 ￿
q1(1￿p0)+p0￿q0
1￿q0 and condition (38) requires the opposite as shown in (39).￿
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21Figures
Figure 1: Low-chance scenario: Rents given Frequent Performance Evaluation (black) and In-
frequent Performance Evaluation (gray)
Figure 2: High-chance scenario: Rents given Frequent Performance Evaluation (black) and given
Infrequent Performance Evaluation (gray)
22Figure 3: Maximum signal accuracy ￿ as a function of ￿rst-period success probability p1
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